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THE IMPACT OF THE 12% RESERVE INCOME 
TAX PROVISION UPON THE BANKING STRUCTURE 
Paul D. Lagomarcino* 
O RDINARILY~ it is difficult, if not almost impossible, to measure with any degree of accuracy the impact of a tax provision 
upon an industry. This is often so even after years of experience 
under it. Moreover, with few exceptions, it is an unusual tax 
provision that shapes the fundamental ·practices and competi-
tive relationships within an industry, unless it is purposely direct-
ed to that end as a matter of policy, and, even then, it may 
(and frequently does) fail of its objective. Section 593 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 19541 is unique in all these respects; 
on its face-a provision for a bad debt reserve-it does not ap-
pear extraordinary. Nonetheless, it has had a strong impact 
upon banking practices and the banking structure of the nation, 
and upon competitive relationships within that structure. How-
ever, its impact has not been the one contemplated by Congress: 
the section's greatest uniqueness lies in its success in achieving 
the opposite of the congressional objectives for its enactment. 
Section 593 first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1951.2 This 
act removed the tax exemption traditionally enjoyed by mutual 
banking institutions-mutual savings banks and savings and loan 
associations-and provided for their taxation on the same gen-
eral basis as corporations. Provision also was made by language 
now appearing in section 593 for the deduction of "Additions 
to Reserve for Bad Debts" of these institutions. It provided 
that building and loan associations, and mutual savings banks 
and cooperative banks without capital stock might deduct for 
federal income tax purposes a reasonable addition to a reserve 
for bad debts up to the point it equals "12% of the total de-
posits or withdrawable accounts of its depositors." In effect, sec-
tion ·593 freed these various mutual institutions of federal in-
come tax until their reserve for bad debts exceeded 12 percent 
of deposits. 
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1951 the mutual institution 
• B.A. 1946, University of Iowa, ,LL.B. 1949, George Washington University; Assistant 
Professor of Law, University of Buffalo.-Ed. 
1 68A Stat. 205, 26 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957} §593. 
2 65 Stat. 490-491 (1951). 
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historically had been exempt from federal income taxation, largely 
due to its semi-philanthropic purpose and its mutual form of 
organization. In the Act of 1863,3 the Tariff Act of 1894,4 and 
the Excise Tax Act of 1909,5 the mutual institution had been 
tax exempt. Following the Sixteenth Amendment, the Revenue 
Act of 1913 provided that " ... nothing in this section shall ap-
ply to ... mutual savings banks not having a capital stock repre-
sented by shares .... " 6 This same language appeared in all 
subsequent revenue acts until that of 1951.7 
The mutual savings bank had first been established in the 
early part of the nineteenth century. Its purpose was to en-
courage persons with low incomes to save and thereby to develop 
thrift habits in the hope that these persons then would less 
likely become objects of public charity during periods of econom-
ic depression. A mutual savings bank has no capital stock; theoret-
ically the depositors are the owners of the bank. It is managed 
on their behalf by a self-perpetuating board of trustees. The 
depositors control neither the selection of the trustees nor the 
policies of the bank. 
Today mutual savings banks are a very important part of the 
national banking structure. Mutual savings banks now operate in 
seventeen states.8 At the end of 1956, the nation's 527 mutual sav-
ings banks had time deposits of $30,001 millions and total assets 
of $33,311 millions9 and served over twenty million depositors. 
The savings and loan association had equally humble be-
ginnings. Originally formed by private individuals of moderate 
means under the name of building and loan associations, it was 
contemplated that periodic deposits by all members would per-
mit a few at a time to borrow and thereby to purchase homes un-
til eventually each member in the association would be able to 
own his own home. Typically the savings and loan association 
is a non-stock corporation. Deposits are known as shares to in-
dicate the original proprietary interest of the depositor. 
Like the mutual savings bank, the savings and loan assoc1a-
a 12 Stat. 712 (1863). 
4 28 Stat. 556 (1894). 
5 36 Stat. 112, 113 (1909). 
6 38 Stat. 172 (1913). 
7 65 Stat. 490-491. It appeared in §101(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 
8 SAVINGS BANKS TRUST Co., SAVINGS BANKS FACT BOOK, 1956, p. 121. 
9 FEDERAL RESERVE BuL. 667 Gune 1957). For the states in which the banks operate 
and the amount of deposits in each state, see U.S. SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, SAVINGS 
AND LOAN FACT BooK, 1957, p. 13. 
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tion has had an amazing growth, and, in fact, one which sur-
passed that of the savings bank. At year-end 1956, approximately 
twenty million persons held share accounts totalling $37,302 mil-
lions10 in the nation's 6,100 savings and loan associations.11 
Ordinarily, mutuals have somewhat less operating author-
ity than commercial banks. In general, the mutual institution 
does not provide consumer credit, business loans, or checking 
accounts. On the other hand, mutual savings banks alone of these 
institutions may sell bank life insurance. A distinction also is 
often drawn between the size and types of loans the various 
institutions properly may make. In the past few decades periodic 
grants of operating authority have been made to mutual institu-
tions, which, in the aggregate, have made a fundamental change 
in the original character and services of these institutions and 
which have intensified their competitive pressure upon other 
banking institutions. 
Legislative Background of Section 593 
The Revenue Act of 1951, which eliminated the tax exemp-
tion of the mutual institution, was a war measure. It was de-
signed "to provide extraordinary increases in revenues to meet 
essential national defense expenditures" caused by "the mili-
tary action in Korea, coupled with the general threat to world 
peace."12 Income tax rates were increased and additional sources 
of revenue sought. One source was certain organizations then 
exempt from taxation under section IO I of the applicable In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1939. Among these were the mutual 
banking institutions. 
The original House bill contained no provision for their tax-
ation;13 the provision first appeared in the Senate. In its Report 
accompanying the House bill, the Senate Committee on Finance 
stated that the exemption of these institutions should be re-
moved in view of their size, the need for revenue, and the tax 
discrimination between these institutions and the commercial 
banks and life insurance companies with whom they actively 
competed.14 
10 FEDERAL REsERVE BUL. 677 (June 1957). 
11 U.S. SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, SAVINGS AND LOAN FAcr BOOK, 1957, P· 41. The 
average balance was $1,875 against one of $1,356 five years ago. Id. at 46. 
12 H. Rep. 586, 82d Cong., 1st sess., I, 1951-2 Cum. Bul. 357. 
13 H.R. 4473, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951). 
14 S. Rep. 781, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951-2 Cum. Bui. 458, 473-478. 
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"At the present time, mutual savings banks are in active 
competition with commercial banks and life insurance com-
panies for the public savings, and they compete with many 
types of taxable institutions in the security and real estate 
_ markets. As a result your committee believes that the contin-
uance of the tax-free treatment now accorded mutual savings 
banks would be discriminatory. So long as they are exempt 
frorp. income tax, mutual savings banks enjoy the advantage 
·•, of being able to finance their growth out of earnings with-
out incurring the tax liabilities paid by ordinary corpora-
tions when they undertake to expand through the use of 
their own reserves. The tax treatment provided by your com-
. mittee would place. mutual savings banks on a parity with 
their competitors."15 
The Senate Report also referred · to the tax exempt status 
of savings and loan associations under section 101(4) of the 
applicable Internal Revenue Code of 1939. It stated that, like 
the mutual savings bank, few savings and loan associations re-
tained the true substance of their earlier mutuality. 
· "The steady decline in the proportion of share-accumulation 
loans is evidence that the character of these organizations 
has changed. More and more, investing members are becom-
ing simply depositors, while borrowing members find deal-
, ing with a savings and loan association only technically dif-
ferent from dealing with other mortgage lending institutions 
in which the lending group is distinct from the borrowing 
group. In fact, borrowers ordinarily have very little voice 
in the affairs of mo~t savings and loan associations."16 
The Senate Report provided for taxation of mutual banks 
"in the same manner as ordinary corporations."17 It would also 
P.ermit, "as in the .case of other banks," the deduction of "amounts 
credited to a reasonable reserve for bad debts."18 Suggestion 
had been made that, instead of the _"deduction of a "reasonable" 
reserve, mutuals should. "be taxed only on their net income in 
~xcess of some 'speci~ed reserve.' "19 The Senate rejected the sug-
gestion. Mutual institutions should be treated in the same gen-
eral fashion as commercial banks. 
15 1951-2 Cum. Bul. 476. 
16 Id. at 477. It further stated that the reasons for taxing these associations "after 
making a reasonable allowance for additions to reserves .for bad debts, are the same as 
those on which mutual savings banks are taxed under the bill." Id. at 478. 
17 ld. at 474. 
IS Ibid. 
19 Id. at 476. 
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A commercial bank then deducted as a bad debt allowance 
an amount determined by its loss experience based upon a 20-
year moving average. The Senate Report contemplated that 
this general type of formula should be applied to mutual sav-
ings banks after adopting it for their "historical loss experience."20 
This treatment, the report stated, would afford a deduction "at 
least as generous" as that accorded commercial banks.21 
In conference, the managers on the part of the House agreed 
in principle with the Senate amendment to the original act 
eliminating the exempt status of the mutual institution. The 
House receded with an amendment, however. Instead of agree-
ing to the fluid test of a "reasonable" addition to a reserve for 
bad debts, as proposed by the Senate, the 12 percent reserve 
provision was substituted.22 The move for a "specified" reserve, 
earlier rejected by the Senate Committee,23 had carried in con-
ference. 
The Accomplishment of Legislative Purpose 
One method of measuring the success or failure of an enact-
ment is to determine whether it achieved the purposes for which 
it was enacted. Together with that of raising revenue, let us con-
sider the factors which motivated the taxation of mutual in-
stitutions and passage of section 593 to determine whether in 
this sense it has succeeded. 
20 Id. at 475: "The size of the bad-debt allowance provided in the case of commercial 
banks is determined under administrative rulings by the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue. At present it is provided in the case of commercial banks that the amount which 
can be deducted from taxable income in any one year shall be determined by applying 
the ratio of losses to outstanding loans during the past 20 years, to the loans outstanding 
in the current year. These reserves are limited to three times the current 20-year loss 
ratio. In the case of mutual savings banks also, the formula permitted may be quite 
different from that now provided for commercial banks if the Commissioner after investi-
gation finds that the historical loss experience of these institutions differs substantially 
from that of commercial banks. In fact, your committee believes that the loss experience 
of these banks should be based upon a period of at least 25 years if this, in the aggregate, 
would result in greater loss deductions for these banks than the 20-year period now 
provided in the case of commercial banks. Basing loss reserve deductions on the loss 
experience of the past 20 or 25 years will include a period in which the losses of the 
mutual savings banks were quite large, with the result that the loss reserve deductions 
permitted in the next several years will be relatively large." 
21 Id. at 476. Again, savings and loan associations would be similarly treated. Id. 
at 478. 
22 H. Rep. 1213, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951-2 Cum. Bul. 287, 300. 
In 1951 the book surplus of savings banks in the nation was 11.7% of deposits. It 
had not exceeded 12% of deposits nationally since 1941 and has not exceeded it since 
that year. SAVINGS BANKS TRUST Co., SAVINGS BANKS FAcr BooK, 1956, p. 202. 
23 Page 404 supra. 
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Revenue. One purpose was "to provide extraordinary in-
creases in revenues to meet essential national defense expendi-
tures."24 It was estimated that the taxation of mutual institu-
tions would bring $140 millions in revenue.2:; 
Revenue actually raised has been relatively insignificant. For 
example, between 1952 and 1954, inclusive, insured mutual sav-
ings banks paid total federal income tax of approximately $7 
millions on total net operating income before taxes and divi-
dends of approximately $1,553 millions, or at an effective rate 
of 0.45 percent; between 1953 and 1955, inclusive, member sav-
ings and loan associations paid total federal income tax of $15.8 
millions on total net income before federal income tax of $2,964 
millions, or at an effective rate of 0.53 percent.26 During the 
period 1952 to 1956, inclusive, those commercial banks which 
were members of the Federal Reserve System paid total federal 
income tax of $3,513 millions on total profits before income taxes 
of $8,315 millions, or at an effective rate of 42 percent.;7 If enact-
ment of section 593 had resulted in tax parity and operating ex-
perience had been identical, the taxation of mutual institutions 
at the same effective rates as commercial banks would have in-
creased federal income tax revenues by at least six hundreds of 
millions of dollars per year. 
It is apparent that the taxation of mutual institutions failed 
to raise the amount contemplated or the far larger amount which 
would have been raised if tax parity had been achieved. 
Tax Parity with Competitors. Increasing corporation tax rates 
to 52 percent in the Act of 1951 aggravated the discrimination in 
tax then existing between mutuals and their competitors. Ac-
cordingly, the Senate Report gave as a second purpose to "place 
mutual savings banks on a [tax] parity with their competitors."28 
It has already been shown, however, that the effective rate 
of tax paid by mutuals is only a small fraction-roughly one-
eightieth-of that paid by their competitors.29 
The affected mutual institutions reacted with substantial uni-
formity to the Act of 1951. The anticipated effect of the 12 per-
24 Note 12 supra. 
25 S. Rep. 781, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951-2 Cum. Bul. 471, 473. 
26 SAVINGS BANKS TRUST Co., SAVINGS BANKS FACT BOOK, 1956, p. 198; FEDERAL HOME 
LOAN BANK BOARD, COMBINED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 1955, p. 49; FEDERAL HOME LoAN 
BANK BOARD, COMBINED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 1954, p. 49. 
27FEDERAL RESERVE BUL. 517 (May 1957). 
28 1951-2 Cum. Bul. 476, 622-623. 
29 Notes 26 and 27 supra. 
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cent reserve provision might be nullified simply through 
maintenance of reserves less than 12 percent of dep0sits. 
This could be accomplished both by reducing net income 
through tax deductible expenses and also by increasing the 
deposit base against which the 12 percent was to be ap-
plied. Income used for public relations purposes-advertising, 
free gifts, new or remodeled offices, and so on-were deductible 
business expenses. These expenditures not only reduced net 
income, but, in turn, attracted new deposits, thereby increas-
ing the deposit base. Similarly, payment of increased dividends 
also was deductible30 and attracted additional deposits as well. 
Here was a nearly ideal tax and business situation. The act had 
an effect opposite to the Senate intent31 by both encouraging 
growth as a business practice and subsidizing it at the expense 
of tax dollars. 
Enactment of the Act of 1951 has not prevented the growth 
of the mutual. Since then, these institutions have expanded with 
great rapidity. At the end of 1950, mutual savings banks had 
total assets of $22,385 millions32 and savings and loan associa-
tions had total assets of $16,893 millions.83 Between year-end 
1950 and 1956, assets of savings and loan associations increased 
to $43,098 millions34 and had surpassed the assets of the mutual 
savings banks which had increased to $33,311 millions.35 Per-
centage growth of the savings bank and the loan association re-
spectively was 49 percent and 255 percent. In terms of dollar 
growth, share accounts in savings and loan associations increased 
between 1950 and 1956 from $13,992 millions to $37,302 mil-
lions86 and accounts in savings banks from $20,009 millions to 
$30,001 millions.37 During this same period, time deposits in 
commercial banks increased from $36,503 millions to $50,908 
millions, or 40 percent.88 Deposit growth of mutual institutions 
so Revenue Act of 1951, §313(£). 
81 "So long as they are exempt from income tax, mutual savings banks enjoy the 
advantage of being able to finance their growth out of earnings without incurring the 
tax liabilities paid by ordinary corporations when they undertake to expand through 
the use of their own reserves." 1951-2 Cum. Bui. 476. 
82 FEDERAL REsERVE BtlL. 667 Gune 1957). 
sa Id. at 677. 
34 lbid. 
85 Id. at 667. 
88 Id. at 677. 
87 Id. at 667. 
SB Ibid. 
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surpassed commercial banks both in percentage, and, more sig-
nificantly, in dollar amount as well. 
In a period as economically dynamic as this, many out-of-
the-ordinary forces affected the various banking institutions. In-
flation, unprecedented growth in the mortgage market, and high 
levels of consumption and industrial expansion-all have caused 
substantial growth in all institutions. Nonetheless, the asset 
growth of mutuals consists primarily of deposit growth, which 
was made possible largely by the payment of higher interest rates 
than other banking institutions. It seems inescapable that these 
rates would not have been feasible in the absence of the failure to 
achieve tax parity in the Act of 195 I. 
Other Criteria of the Public Interest 
Apart from success or failure in the accomplishment of these 
congressional purposes, and looking away from the area of com-
petitive impact, has section 593 succeeded from other perspec-
tives of the public interest? Can it then be justified on another 
basis? In other words, apart from its apparent failure to achieve 
congressional purposes, have other benefits flowed in such a 
measure from its enactment as to outweigh its demonstrated 
defects? 
Reserves. The importance of safe reserve levels in banking 
institutions can hardly be overstated: the reserves of a banking 
institution are the main source of protection to its depositors. 
Federal deposit insurance is long on public morale value, but it 
is funded only to the extent of 1.5 percent of deposits.39 At the 
present time Federal Reserve Board jurisdiction fails to extend 
to mutual" banking institutions.40 No arbitrary acceptable per-
centage of reserves applicable to each institution can be estab-
lished. Necessary reserve levels depend upon the individual in-
stitution's relation of cash and near cash to deposits, the form 
of other assets to deposits, the inflow and outflow of deposits, 
and the amount of mortgage anticipation payments, among oth-
ers. 
In any event, due tq a number of factors-the absence of 
required reserves, the need of mutuals to invest almost all funds 
39 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT, Dec. 31, 1956, p. 16. The percentage 
-0f funds to insured deposits was 1.44%. On -Dec. 31, 1956, the total assets of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation was $1,800 millions. Ibid. 
40 At the end of 1956, three mutual institutions were voluntary members of the 
Federal Reserve System. FEDERAL REsERVE BUL. 931, n. I (August 1957). 
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to maintain high interest payments, and the influence of sec-
tion 593-the reserves and undivided profits of mutual institu-
tions as a percentage of savings capital have diminished yearly. 
In the case of savings and loan associations, for example, reserves 
:and undivided profits as a percentage of savings declined from 
9.15 percent to 8.01 percent between 1950 and 1955.41 
Today, there is neither requirement in the banking law nor 
incentive in the tax law to maintain higher reserve levels. In 
fact, under section 593, the accumulation of reserves to more 
desirable levels well might be penalized by the imposition of tax. 
A statute which penalizes safer reserve levels fails to advance the 
public interest. 
Control over the National Economy. The Federal Reserve 
System helps counteract inflationary and deflationary movements 
in the economy, and assists in creating conditions favorable to 
high employment, stable values, national growth and a rising 
level of consumption. To accomplish these objectives, the board 
depends in large measure upon its power to affect the avail-
ability, cost and volume of reserves of its member banks and to fix 
rates for the discounting of commercial paper. By these means, 
together with the purchase and sale of government securities in 
the open market, it influences the flow of credit and thereby aids 
in fostering an orderly economic growth. 
The tremendous growth of mutuals and the lack of juris-
diction over them by the Federal Reserve Board may have a far 
broader implication than those already mentioned. This lies 
in the steady decrease in control over the national economy by 
the Federal Reserve Board which· has paralleled the steady in-
crease in deposits of mutual institutions. 
The Board has authority over its member institutions only. 
At the end of 1956, 6,462 of the nation's 13,640 commercial 
banks, or 4 7 percent, were members and these members held 
85 percent of adjusted demand deposits, and 80 percent of time 
deposits in commercial banks, nationally.42 Members held 84 
percent of total demand and time deposits in commercial banks. 
These percentages permit the Federal Reserve System to control 
effectively the reserves and availability of credit of commercial 
banks. 
It is true that the action of the System upon its member banks 
41 FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, SOURCE BooK, 1956, p. 10. 
42 FEDERAL R.EsERVE BUL. 667 (June 1957). 
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has a peripheral regulatory effect upon mutual institutions which 
also are a part of the money market. 1;:>espite this, an important 
question is whether this peripheral control is adequate control 
today. More specifically, the impact of the mutual on the money 
market is becoming· increasingly greater to the extent that direct 
control or jurisdiction may well be indicated. 
Today, the argument would run, the commercial bank is 
but one of many important sources of credit, which now also 
includes the mutual institution, insurance company, credit union 
and even the large industrial corporation. Until the postwar 
years, the deposits of mutual institutions were small in a relative 
sense and the lack of Reserve Board control over them did not 
impair the working of the regulatory scheme. This is no longer 
true. If time deposits in mutual savings banks in 1956 of $30,001 
millions43 are taken into consideration as a credit source, and add-
ed to commercial bank demand and time deposits, instead of 
affecting 84 percent of the credit represented by all deposits, 
the board could affect only 71 percent. Adding share accounts 
in savings and loan associations in 1956 of $37,302 millions44 
as another credit source, the percentage affected drops to 60 
percent. Add life insurance reserves of $79,738 millions45 and 
the percentage drops to 42 percent. If funds in credit unions, 
postal savings, and the like also were considered, the percentage 
of available credit which the Federal Reserve Board can affect 
would be smaller. 
Thus the Federal Reserve Board reaches only a fraction of 
the national credit market. To achieve a desired effect upon the 
economy as a whole, it necessarily must exert a greater pressure 
upon that particular portion than if it directly reached all or 
substantially all credit sources. As the participation of member 
banks in the national credit market decreases by virtue of the 
deposit growth of non-member mutual institutions, it seems 
inevitable that the system will have to "regulate" its members 
just that much harder in order to achieve a desired over-all 
result. 
Benefits Under Section 593. A situation is hardly ever entirely 
black. A number of desirable consequences have flowed in the 
past few years from enactment of section 593. First, thrift has 
43 Ibid. 
44 Id. at 677. 
45 LIFE INSURANCE FAcr BOOK, 1957, p. 57. 
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been fostered. Mutual institutions have attracted new accounts 
and additional deposits in old accounts through active public 
relations efforts and the payment of high interest rates. This 
has been a mixed blessing, however, because one consequence 
of these efforts has been an inflated emphasis on dividend size 
as an investment factor. Second, mutuals have increased their 
assets to a point of greater over-all strength. Third, the success 
of mutuals in the savings field, together with the desire to at-
tract deposits in a tight money market, has caused large num-
bers of commercial banks to reexamine their own policies and 
activities in respect to these deposits. Commercial banks have 
become more competitive for savings accounts. Unfortunately, 
this also is a mixed benefit, since some commercial banks may 
have set interest rates beyond sound and economic levels in an 
attempt to compete with the interest which can be paid by the 
more favored mutual institutions. 
These are desirable consequences. But, these or similar ones 
can be had, and would follow, in the case of almost any organ-
ization which is exempt from tax. It is difficult to justify the 
existence of these benefits, which, after all, are obtained by 
depositors in mutual institutions at the expense of the remain-
der of the tax-paying public. 
Other Problems Raised by the Growth of the Mutual Institution 
These are only a few of the important criteria with which 
to test the efficacy and desirability of the section. The growth of 
the mutual has raised other areas of inquiry as well. 
1. Over 97 percent of the deposits of savings and loan asso-
ciations and substantial amounts of the deposits of savings banks 
have been placed in home mortgages with long terms of twenty 
to thirty years. Approximately 36 billion dollars are tied up in 
savings and loan associations alone.46 To what extent has this 
practice of so narrowing its credit to one segment of the economy 
contributed to the current tight money situation in the economy 
generally? Does the rising cost for the use of money by both 
government and industry (which may be an embarrassingly high 
fixed charge against operations in any future period of econom-
ic depression) suggest that the placement of this money is a mat-
ter of grave public concern? 
46 U.S. SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, SAVINGS AND •LOAN FACT BOOK, 1957, p. 45. 
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2. How has the growth of mutual institutions and their in-
ability to create money affected the availability of funds for in-
dustrial expansion? Should action be taken to make it possible 
for mutual institutions to create money as commercial banks. 
now do by means of fractional reserves upon demand deposits? 
3. Liquid assets of a financial institution, which are needed 
to meet its cash requirements, consist of the United States Gov-
ernment securities, cash on hand, and cash in other banks. Sav-
ings and loan associations maintained a liquidity ratio of ap-
proximately 13 percent of deposits.47 Is this liquidity sufficient in 
view of the fact that an important part of the deposit growth of 
mutual institutions seems to have been attracted mainly by their 
higher interest rates and, therefore, lacks the stability of a true 
savings account? 
4. The area of competition between commercial institutions. 
and mutual institutions in terms of size and services offered in-
creases yearly. Is it possible to avoid a banking structure, which, 
in time, 1yill consist of institutions of equal size and equal operat-
ing authority competing for identical business, but with the 
difference that one type of institution is freed of tax and control 
over reserves and the other not? Where, when, and by whom 
is the line to be drawn beyond which additional operating author-
ity will not be granted mutual institutions? 
5. Does a solution to the problem of increased competition 
possibly lie in the commercialization of mutual institutions or 
in the mutualization of commercial institutions, assuming either 
is possible? Should appropriate statutory amendments be made 
to permit a commercial institution to "purchase" or absorb a 
mutual institution by merger or otherwise? 
6. Should commercial institutions be prevented by law from 
serving the small saver and this service reserved to the mutual 
institutions and, at the same time, the mutual institution pre~ 
vented from serving the larger and business accounts and this 
service reserved to commercial institutions? How can such a 
distinction be drawn oetween the "small" saver and the "large" 
saver-by size of initial deposit, by size of later deposits, by th~ 
business or non-business character of the depositor? 
47 At the end of 1956, savings and loan associations had U.S. Government securities 
and cash on hand and in other banks of $4,960 millions against deposits of $37,300 
millions, or 13%. U.S. SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, SAVINGS AND LOAN FAcr BOOK, 1957, 
pp. 45, 47. Eliminating advances by the Federal Home Loan Bank the percentage is 
9.7%, Ibid. 
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7. Should Federal Reserve Board control be imposed over 
all financial institutions, including mutual institutions, credit 
unions, large business corporation lending, and insurance com-
panies? Is their regulation a categorical necessity to regulate our 
national economy effectively? 
Conclusion 
Whatever conclusions one may draw from these facts, the 
dark consequences predicted to follow upon taxation of mutuals 
in 1951 by opponents of the measure have not occurred. Tax-
ation of mutual institutions has not destroyed the incentive to 
save, prevented the payment of reasonable dividends or the 
allocations of funds to reserves where management has desired 
it, impaired the financial soundness of these institutions, placed 
an undue burden on the thrifty, or increased the cost of home 
ownership in any manner other than it has already been m-
creased by tight money and other causes. 
Several conclusions may be drawn, however, from the ex-
perience under section 593 to help achieve the congressional ob-
jectives which· are still sound today, but which have been so 
vastly unrealized since its enactment. 
First, it would be foolish and wishful to think it possible to 
turn back the clock and to reshape mutual institutions into the 
small, ineffective and semi-philanthropic organizations of a cen-
tury, or even three decades, ago. These institutions now must 
be accepted with their present size, influence, and powers, and 
must be given consideration and treatment as large, effective 
and semi-commercial banking organizations. 
Second, the congressional purpose in 1951 to achieve tax 
parity among competing banking institutions is still .sound today. 
In fact, due to the growth in size and powers of mutual institu-
tions, the problems to be corrected are more critical today than 
six years ago. Mutual and commercial banking institutions are 
competitive both in terms of size of institution and services 
offered, and this competition has increased yearly. Discrimina~ 
tion in tax treatment between competing institutions which pro-
vide almost identical services ordinarily cannot be justified as 
a matter of simple justice. As between commercial banking in-
stitutions and mutual banking institutions, there is no reason 
sufficient to justify a tax discrimination under which one pays in-
come tax at a rate 80 times greater than the other. 
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Third, ideally, both types of institutions should be taxed iden-
tically. Two alternatives are available. Commercial institutions 
might be taxed at the same effective rate as mutuals. This al-
ternative is specious on its face; there would be an annual tax 
loss of between approximately $675 millions and $700 millions 
from member banks of the Federal Reserve System alone.48 
The other alternative is to repeal section 593 and, instead, to 
allow mutuals to receive the bad· debt reserve treatment now 
given commercial institutions under the Internal Revenue Code. 
This alternative would increase federal tax revenues by almost 
the same amount annually. Obviously, the second alternative 
is the sounder. 
Fourth, the activities of mutual institutions now make a sub-
stantial impact on the national credit market. It would seem, 
therefore, that the Federal Reserve Board should be given juris-
diction over them to enable it to carry out its functions equitably 
and more effectively. This action also would cause reserves of 
mutual institutions, and particularly savings and loan associa-
tions, to be increased to more desirable levels. 
Fifth, the grant of additional operating rights to mutual in-
stitutions merely aggravates the existing critical competitive sit-
uation. Annual grants of authority have made a patchwork bank-
ing structure. Additional operating authority should be consid-
ered concurrently with measures to eliminate tax discrimination 
among institutions. 
Sixth, following the establishment of substantial equality of 
obligation in income tax and reserve requirements among all 
banking institutions, it would follow then that the mutual in-
stitution should be given substantial equality of rights in other 
matters, perhaps additional branch banking authority and pro-
vision of consumer credit and checking accounts. 
Undoubtedly the soundest conclusion of all would be that 
these data and questions show a critical need for a comprehensive 
and searching study of our national banking structure: a study 
that would show the way to a sound and equitable relationship 
between competing banking institutions and even between the 
regulatory schemes of the federal government and of the in-
dividual states. Such a study is essential, if we are to maintain the 
sound national economy so vital to our leadership of the free 
world. 
48 Page 406 supra. 
